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The view that the opening up of Africa by metropolitan capitalism,
more particularly during the period of direct colonial rule, was bound
to lead through evolutionary stages to economic development and moder-
nisation, has long since fallen into scholarly disrepute. In the at-
mosphere of radical pessimism that has pervaded academic perspectives on
Aftica since independence, an altogether more sceptical view of the bene-
ficence of Africa's integration into imperial economies has prevailed.
But as is so often the case in scholarly debate, thesis and. antithesis
occupy the same battle-ground, and both tend to view the world through
similar lenses; What modernisation and underdevelopment theories have
in common is the assumption of a single universal dynamic in the making
of the modern world. Exposure to market forces is destined either to
reshape Third World societies in the image of industrial Europe, or to
*underdevelop' them in the interests of capital accumulation in the
metropoles.
In particular, underdevelopment theory tends toward an assumption
of the omnipotence of metropolitan capitalism. Thus the initial premise
that has shaped so much analysis of contemporary Africa is that peasants
survived as a fundamental element in African economies because i t was
in the interests of capital that they should be maintained - either as
producers of cash crops or as exporters of labour. Such arguments are
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usually couched in terms of the advantages to be gained by reliance on
African social systems to subsidise::capitalist profits - insofar as sub-
sistence production by peasant households helped to keep both wages and
2
the cost of producing cash crops low.
Such a position, however, overlooks the very limited power which
colonial administrations had to re-order African societies in radically
different ways.and the real potential for African resistance and African
agency in shaping their own responses to colonial pressures. Underdeve-
lopment, far from being a reflection of the requirements of metropolitan
capitalism, can perhaps better be seen partly in terms of the inherent
tenacity of African social and economic systems, and also in terms of
the weakness of the colonial state in Africa and its inability to pro-
pel and preside over the sorts of social upheavals that the spread of
capitalist relations would have entailed. Indeed, the colonial state
often proved reluctant (until late in the colonial period) to allow
rural capitalism, with all its disruptive consequences, to develop too
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far. Colonial administrators were concerned to prevent the exclusionary
accumulation of resources by individuals from getting out of hand, and
to inhibit precolonial political elites from taking advantage of new
opportunities to extend their exploitative control over land and labour
beyond a certain safe point. What needs to be stressed, then, is the
failure of incorporation of peasants into more intensive market rela-
tionships. The persistance of peasant economies, far from being a re-
flection of profit-maximising rationality on the part of outsiders, might
indeed be a major constraint :>n capital accumulation and profit-making -
both internally and externally.
Even in colonies of white settlement in tropical Africa, such as
Kenya, settlers, for all their political influence, were never able to
forge a state structure that was sufficiently subservient to their
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interests. In Kenya a well-established and sustainable settler capitalism
failed to strike root at the expense of the black peasant economy, con-
trary to much conventional wisdom about the %destruction' of the pea-
santry. Similarly in Southern Rhodesia, where, unlike Kenya, settlers
did control the state, the black rural economy, far from precipitously
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declining by the 1930s in the face of a rampant settler capitalism,'
seems instead to have survived the worst intentions of the settlers,
a
and indeed has advanced markedly since the Second World War.
This recent rethinking of the nature and causes of African under-
development has tended to emphasise the startling uniqueness of the South
African case, where mechanised white-controlled agriculture came to mono-
polise internal and export produce markets during the course of the twen-
tieth century, and where the areas of black peasant production were even-
tually reduced to sub-subsistent labour reserves. The break-through to
a generalised rural capitalism such as has occurred in South Africa imr
plies a process which can usefully be described as ^primitive accumula-
tion*. This refers to the accumulation and monopolisation of productive
resources by some at the expense of others, and the corollative forging
of a labouring class, dependent on selling its labour in order to sur-
vive. The mobilisation of productive resources in the hands of indivir
dual accumulators has been a feature of colonialism in various parts of
Africa (cocoa and groundnut farmers in West Africa, cotton and coffee
farmers in East Africa spring to mind) but nowhere outside of South Afri-
ca has accumulation led to a fully capitalist agriculture generalised
throughout the state. The historically problematical nature of such
capitalist transformations in agriculture has often been underestimated.
In the South African case, capitalist agriculture has usually been ac-
cepted as an unproblematical consequence of the rise of extractive
industry in a white-supremacist society. The rest of this paper seeks
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to investigate some of the dimensions of this transition in the South Afri-
can context, in the hope that examining the exceptional case might throw
some light on the wider experience.
In South Africa's colonial economy, enclaves of export-oriented
settler production arose in different areas at various times in the pre-
industrial past: firstly, in the wheat and wine farms of the south-wes-
tern Cape, based on imported slave labour, from the seventeenth century
onward; commercial wool and ostrich farming spread through the dry ex-
panses of the eastern Cape interior, based on various forms of semi-ser-
vile and migrant labour, in the mid-nineteenth century; and on the sugar
plantations of the Natal lowlands, indentured Indians were employed from
the 1860s, Our primary focus in this paper, however, is on the far interior
Highveld, settled by extensive Boer pastoralists from the 1840s, for
this was the region which spawned South Africa's industrial revolution,
and which was most radically transformed by the rise of internal urban
markets for agricultural produce from the late nineteenth century onward.
By focusing on the Highveld, the agricultural heartland of twentieth
century South Africa, we can best explore the conditions under which
it was possible for a capitalist transformation of rural society to
take place.
Although the Boer pastoralists of the mid-nineteenth century Highveld
were on the whole on the margins of the mercantile capitalist economies
of the Cape and Natal colonies, they were deeply involved in trade in
animal products with coastal merchants. Wool was the staple export from
areas most closely tied to the colonial economy radiating from the ports.
Trade was also largely based on hunting until at least the 1870s, and much
later in the outer reaches of white settlement. The trade in skins in
particular led to indiscriminate destruction of game. Much of the trade
with interior peoples, black and white, was controlled by Boers themselves;
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and transport riding was also an important source of capital accumula-
tion on the pre-industrial Highveld, The ownership of a wagon and oxen
was as important as a gun and ammunition in the accumulation of capital
amongst Boers seeking to establish themselves as independent pastoralists
and landowners. The Boer Republics of the Highveld established in the
1650s developed a typically colonial elite which consisted of the small
English-speaking mercantile, financial and legal bourgeoisie of the
scattered trading centres, as well as the wealthier of the Boer stock
onwers. For all these, the accumulation of land was the major route
g
to status and the exercise of patronage in the Boer state.
The prevalence of colonial market relations and merchant and spe-
culative capital in shaping the political economy of the Republican
state went hand in hand with forms of accumuld;ion amongst Boer notables
in the early years which involved tributary and clientage relations with
independent indigenous peoples. In areas where black chiefs had patro-
nage of their own to dispense, Boer notables with control over land were
able to enter alliances with African chiefs resident thereon, enabling
the notables to draw off surpluses from black production in the form of
tribute, tax, rent or labour service. Boer notables had access to wealth
in their capacity as military commanders as well. In the absence of any
full-time military or police force, much initiative in raiding African
peoples lay with the elective yeldcornets and with the burgher militias.
However, these pre-industrial forms of accumulation based on the exercise
of patronage and military adventurism were to be displaced fairly rapidly
by the economic revolution attendant on the mineral discoveries of the
last three decades of the century. By the early years of the twentieth
century production of grain for rising urban markets had become the pre-
dominant form of rural enterprise on the Highveld.
Up to the final decades of the nineteenth century, the Boers'
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limited labour requirements for household work or herding were in large
part met by servile relations with acculturated black dependants. On
the Highveld, these dependants frequently had their origins in a pecu-
liarly African form of slavery which involved raiding1 for or purchasing
black children from African slavers, and bringing them up as household
drudges. These relationships would evolve into clientship relations as
11the blacks reached adulthood. Tenant or 'squatter' labour was also
known from tie earliest days; but as agricultural production developed,
as the advance of white land alienation accelerated, and as colonial
domination of indigenous societies strengthened, more and more black
labour was provided by tenant homesteads, who moved away from the
jurisdiction of the black chiefdoms and sought to enter relationships
with white landholders allowing them access to land in return for a
proportion of their surpluses in rent or the labour services of juniors.
Thus the development of an arable agricultural economy in response to
the rise of internal markets coincided with the rise of increasingly
intensive and conflictual relationships between white landholders and
black tenant families, relationships in which the former were by no
means always dominant at first. The significance of these develop-
ments will be examined more closely later.
Eurocentric .perspectives have dominated interpretations of the trans-
formation of rural South Africa which began in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. The pervasive model which scholars have used is that of the
"Prussian path*. First used by Lenin to explain one variant of capi-
talist development, the analogy with east Elbian Germany was further
developed by Barrington Moore in his influential comparative survey of
industrialisation. In analyses of South Africa, the analogy has been
found useful at different times by scholars as diverse as Stanley
Trapido, Martin Legassick, M.L. Morris, Stanley Greenberg and Frederick
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Cooper. The significance of the Prussian experience lies in the tran-
sition to capitalism "from above'. In the paradigmatic Prussian case,
the feudal aristocracy itself took charge of capitalist production,
forcibly turning the serfs into labourers.
The German analogy presented in this schematic way implies funda-
mental continuities on two levels* Firstly, i t implies an evolutionary,
internal transformation of the pre-industrial white landowning class
(the "Boer Junkers' in Morris* terminology) into a class of capitalist
farmers, by an autochtonous and self-generating process of accumulation.
Secondly, i t implies that the rise of an industrial economy and of urban
markets was directly accompanied by the emergence and intensification of
labour tenancy relations between servile black tenant and dominant white
landlord, which were increasingly analogous with and merging into expli-
cit wage labour - what has been called 'internal proletarianisation'.
The model contains the assumption that the process of *labour repres-
sion* was an integral aspect of the rise of commercial agriculture. As
a broad generalisation the model might seem at f irst sight to bear some
superficial resemblance to what happened in South Africa over the long
term. But on both counts i t obscures and misrepresents the real signi-
ficance of the processes involved.
Were the capitalist farmers of the Highveld in the twentieth century
really direct lineal descendants of the landowners of the mid-nineteenth
century? Was capital accumulation autochtonous? Did i t proceed in an
evolutionary trajectory? The evidence suggests the opposite, productive
capital was not generated from agricultural production itself - at least
not indefinitely. The old Boer landowner and extensive pastoralist of the
1860s was more likely to be amongst the victims of the industrial revolu-
tion than amongst i ts beneficiaries. The progressive farmers of the
early twentieth century were more likely to be new settlers of British
or colonial origins than members of the old Boer landowning class. The
great bulk of new capital being invested in agricultural enterprise was
imported from elsewhere ox was accumulated in non-agricultural pursuits.
1 5Many of the most capitalised farmers had alternative sources of income.
Various forms of entrepreneurial activities commonly went hand in hand
with capitalised farming. Many of the capitalised farmers at the end of
the nineteenth century had been (or their fathers had been) espeically en-
terprising- and successful full-time traders, professional transporters and
hunters in earlier years, with favoured access to credit and exchange net-
works. Much agrarian capital was derived from such sources. Many of the
wealthier farmers in the rich arable districts of the eastern Orange Free
State Republic (where capitalised arable farming emerged earlier than
elsewhere) owned mills and steam threshing machines with which to service
the crops of surrounding farmers. Some owned fleets of transport wagons.
Some combined farming enterprises with large-scale trading and speculation
17in the produce of Easutoland as well as the Free State farms. '
Land speculation was a common form of primary enrichment. Many
early land accumulators were able to make massive profits later. Many
landowners had been enriched by periodic speculative booms in land in the
Cape Colony as a result of the development of sheep farming from the 1840s,
and more spectacularly in the intermittent ostrich feather booms in the
years between 1G70 and 1914i a n° 'the related great demand for lucerne
grown under irrigation. These speculative booms spread throughout the
Cape midlands and into the Free State, as capital derived by landowner ship
in the districts at the epicentre was invested massively in further land
purchases. The amount of productive potential thus generated amongst
landowners and their descendants was considerable, and the eddies were
felt far and wide as young men in search of new land to settle, moved
1 R
northwards. It was under circumstances such as these that the potential
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was created for the capitalisation of farming on the Highveld. Indeed,
it was a commonplace observation at the time that most progressive far-
mers in a district were the late arrivals, often colonial farmers from
older areas of settlement in the Cape or Natal who had cashed in on the
higher land values available there and in consequence were able to invest
19
capital in improvements on newly acquired land on the Highveld.
Furthermore, a number of examples can be given of industrially or
commercially generated wealth being invested in farming. *Randlords like
Henry Nourse, Sir Abe Bailey and Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, the Bourkes from
the eastern Transvaal goldfields, the Newberrys from the Diamond Fields,
and the Lewis and Marks Company, one of the earliest industrial companies
to diversify in a large way beyond raining, were all involved in the deve-
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lopment of highly capitalised farming operations on the Highveld. Names
that regularly recurred amongst the prize-winners at the big agricultural
shows in Johannesburg, Bloemfontein and Kimberley included such represen-
tatives of finance capital as Sir George Farrar, De Beers Consolidated
Mines, the Smartt Syndicate, as well as big merchant firms as D. and
D.H. Fraser of Wepener, who not only had a dozen trading stations in
Basutoland, but were amongst the Free State's leading sheep breeders.
Amongst the capitalist farmers were those who farmed company land and
who had access to corporate funds. Others combined farming with pro-
22fitable legal and auctioneering businesses.
A singularly telling example of this process is provided by the mi-
ning magnate Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, whose estate, BucJcland Downs, bought
in 1902, was a model scientific farm. The essential nature of the enter-
prise, however, is revealed by Fitzpatrick's biographer: *the property
was always a cheque-book farm, into which it was constantly necessary
to pour large sums of money. . .. The returns from the farming opera-
tions were minimal, the costs prodigious.' Also revealing as to the nature
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of the enterprise is the fact that the estate was used for hunting. I t
was stocked with eland, wildebees and springbok, and Fitzpatrick imported
23deer from England and Scotland. J Farming for Fitzpatrick as for so many
other wealthy men was an object of conspicuous consumption. Thus was the
self-made capitalist entrepreneur transformed into a member of a new gentry.
Here, as on much other land belonging to companies or wealthy men, hunting
had been radically transformed from a major economic activity on which
much rural accumulation was based, to a sport for gentlemen from Johannes-
burg or Kimberley. More practical and less wealthy landowners might have
preferred stocking the land with black sharecroppers rather than red deer. 4
Indeed, i t seems to have been not uncommon for the best known and
most capitalised farming enterprises with access to abundant finance from
non-agricultural sources to have been thoroughly uneconomic. Not only
was autochtonous accumulation from rural production alone atypical if
not impossible over the long term, but even where capital was readily
available for investment in farming, i t s availability did not guarantee
profits. Capital-intensive enterprises did not invariably pay dividends
corresponding to the level of capital investment. Tom Minter, who sold
his half-option on the diamondiferous farm, Rietgat, for ,£30,000 in 1898,
and invested part of the proceeds in a steam plough worthj£4»000 with which
he intended raising 30,000 bags of wheat a year, ended up bankrupt. In
1904 J.A. McLaren, South African agent of the steam plough, manufacturers,
John Fowler and Company of Leeds, rented 2,000 acres on which he spent
large sums of money over ten years to demonstrate the viability of steam
ploughing under South African conditions. Nevertheless, despite high
yields (40,000 bags of grain in 1910), the enterprise lost £35,000 in
a l l . Again, in 1915* Robert Seggie of Holfontein, Kroonstad, was involved
in a suit against the sellers of a steam traction engine for ploughing
which had been a ^complete fai lure ' . The action cost Seggie some £2,000. ^
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to maintain i t s early momentum by for e.g. creating marketing monopolies
and restraining African commercial ini t ia t ive. (As a recent example
from a large l i terature, see Douglas Rimmer, *The Economic Imprint of
Colonialism and Domestic Food Supplies in British Tropical Africa,'
in Robert Botberg (ed.), Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East
and Central Africa, (Lexington, Mass., 1983).) Both these approaches
directly contradict the global teleology represented by underdevelop-
ment theory, and stress the limitations on Europe's capacity either
to profit from or to develop African colonies.
5. See Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa; Pnderdevelopment and an Uncaptured
Peasantry, (London, 1980), 21-23, who asserts that the optimal inter-
rests of western capitalism required the replacement of pre-existing
productive relationships. Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelop-
ment: a Marxist Analysis, (London, 1975)> asserts from an explicitly
Marxist perspective that underdevelopment is a consequence of insuffi-
cient exploitation by metropolitan capital (55)» See also Bill Warren,
Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, (London, 1980), who seeks to re-
surrect Harx's own view of capitalism as a progressive, revolutionary
force in the colonial world.
6. As an example from what is now a considerable body of l i terature, see
Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: the Making of an
African Petite-Bourgeoisie, (New Haven, 1980). The older conventional
wisdom is reflected in e.g. R.D. V/olff, The. Economics of Colonialism:
Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930, (New Haven, 1974).
7- The image evoked in R. Palmer and £.N. Parsons, (ed.s), The Roots of
Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, (London, 1977).
8. T.0. Ranger, ^Growing from the Roots: Reflections on Peasant Research
in Central and Southern Africa,' Journal of Southern African Studies,
5 (1978); John McCracken, ^Rethinking Rural Poverty,' Journal of -
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It is perhaps ironic that Seggie had himself written some years earlier
that
The ox is the natural draught animal for South Africa,
and, therefore, the horse, steamplough or any other in-
vention will never replace it. The price that we get
for our produce is too low, and the product per acre
is too small, that any ploughing which costs more than
from 8d to 1s per English acre would be too high, with
all the other drawbacks that we have, to leave a mar-
gin of profit. 25
In the light of this estimate it is significant to note that steam ploughing
on the Vereeniging Estates was computed to cost some 4s per acre, even with
the ready availability of coal from the nearby collieries. Sir Percy Fitz-
patrick was advised by the Director of Agriculture upon enquiry that 10s
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might be a more realistic estimate on Buckland Downs. Capital intensity
under these conditions was as likely as not to undermine the profitability
of the enterprise.
During boom periods (such as immediately after the Anglo-Boer War),
the capital base of white farming was expanding rapidly, particularly as
a result of injections of capital from elsewhere as new settlers moved on-
to the Highveld bringing capital with them. However, the bulk of white
landholders did not have unlimited capital resources at their disposal for
investment. Undercapitalisation was the normal condition for most. Yet
the old Boer landowner could not simply opt out of the spread of arable
farming. Drought, disease and war devastation in the 1890s and early 1900s
caused a gradual slide by white landholders into indebtedness, mainly
through the bonding of landed property, aggravated by the flood of specu-
lative capital surging through the countryside in the wake of the gold dis-
coveries on the Witwatersrand. Older productive activities were becoming
less and less viable as commercial hunting disappeared, trade and transport
fell under the control of a professional mercantile class and as extensive
pastoralism declined in the face of fencing and the rising value of land.
Moreover, the larger farms of the past were being subdivided to pay off
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debts or restock, which tended to promote a shift to cultivation of the
soil.
Resident white landholders who were increasingly dependent on pro-
ducing grain for the market commonly turned to sharecropping re la t ionships
with black tenants, often as a supplement to the i r own e f fo r t s . As land-
holders found that arable farming was becoming more and more indispensable
for their survival , they became increasingly dependent on the capi ta l r e -
sources and sk i l l s of black tenants. This did not always or inevitably
imply expl ic i t sharecropping arrangements. But i t did usually mean use of
Africans* ploughing oxen and equipment in order to get a sizeable crop in
the ground. The black tenant farmer was far more able to ride the des-
tructive impact of natural disaster and war-induced deprivation without
contracting debt than the i r white counterparts, due to thei r extensive
networks of kinship and the ethics of communality and rec iproci ty . Par
from being a *quasi-feudal' re la t ionship associated with the p re - cap i t a l i s t
pas t , sharecropping was a product of the ear ly stages of South Africa 's
29industr ia l revolution.
I t is in the context of the uncertaint ies and r i sks involved in ca-
p i t a l investmentand the unpredictable productivity of rura l resources that
the prevalence of sharecropping relat ionships between white and black should
be seen. Sharecropping was a compromise between whiteswho lacked suff icient
capi ta l to acquire equipment and to secure an adequate labour force»and
blacks with the labour resources, tools and s k i l l s to take advantage of
the abundance of land which whites controlled. I t was the way in which
black households without a l te rnat ive access to land and white landholders
without sk i l l s or the capi ta l to cul t iva te the so i l intensively themselves
responded to the new opportunities and new pressures presented by the r i s e
of internal markets and by the penetration of ru ra l areas by mercantile
and speculative capi ta l .^ The extensive nature of land use and re la t ive
sparsity of white settlement gave blacks a lot of leverage in the terras
under which they entered productive relationships with white landlords*
Sharecropping was thus also related to the relatively abundant land re-
sources which characterised the interior regions of white settlement in
the late nineteenth century, and the consequent weakness of the settler
economy in the mobilisation of labour resources from the indigenous so-
cieties.
Sharecropping on the white-settled Highveld served as a transition
from a relatively peripheral colonial rural economy linked into capita-
list markets through the provision of animal products, to an arable hinter-
land feeding rapidly growing urban markets in an industrialising economy.
Sharecropping was a bridge to a more explicitly capitalist agriculture in
which there was no place for black household production. But this model
is only valid from the vantage point of the historian. For at the time
it was not objectively determined that sharecropping .relations would
eventually make way for capitalist farming. There was no inevitability
about the process whereby capital was generated within the farming economy.
Clearly sharecropping surpluses provided a potential base for capital accu-
mulation for individual white landholders. But for many whites, black
production meant no so much eapital generation as survival on the land.
It was primarily state intervention which eventually was to provide the
wherewithal for undercapitalised whites to launch however tenuously into
capitalist farming, as we shall see below.
Sharecropping relations between white and black were never regarded
as legitimate in the dominant perceptions of whites. Sharecropping on
the farms was largely practised outside formal civil sanctions and pres-
cription. Whites were generally very reluctant to admit that they were
so 'degenerate' as to rely on *kaffir farmers', and dominant populist
ideology was fiercely antagonistic to any form of black economic indepen-
dence. Hence the drive to suppress black sharecropping in legislation,
and the drive of .various governments to pour large sums of capital into
white farming. There was generally an intense desire by white farmers
to establish greater control over productive activities on their land for
*cultural* reasons, quite apart from any rational calculation of costs
and benefits.
It is not surprising to discover that public'perception often con-
flicted with private behaviour. Many who condemned black tenant farming
enterprise were themselves dependent in some or other degree on the skills
and capital resources of black tenants. As a perceptive observer wrote
in 1908:
One sometimes thinks that nothing could more embar-
rass the farmers individually than that very enforce-
ment of the squatting laws which they are always col-
lectively asking for. If the native squatter is so
great an evil, how comes it that nine farmers out of
ten are willing to put their land at his disposal?
The rhetorical ideal of a fully capitalised agriculture was no less po*
tent for being quite unattainable for most (at any rate by 1°.O8 when
theae words were penned).
There are no universal *laws of capital* which explain why wage re-
lationships between white master and black servant have been generalised
throughout the South African countryside, and why the black sharecropping
peasants eventually disappeared. The nature of agricultural enterprise
is such that it is questionable whether capital investment in rural pro-
duction was consistently remunerative enough to justify the risks invol-
ved, when compared to the advantages of leaving cultivation in the hands
of a sharecropping tenantry, and given the fact that the technology and
productive processes at the disposal of the white farmer were not yet
substantially different from those employed by the black tenant house-
hold. Indeed, it is very unlikely that rational considerations of oppor-
tunity cost in a narrow economic sense had much bearing on white farmers*
image of the ideal relationship between black and white. The exercise
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of class power imposed i ts own constraints and limitations on economic
decision-making1. The landed whites saw themselves as an emergent class,
a class in the making; and their corporate self-perception was based
fundamentally on a pre-existing sense of racial identity.
The Afrikaner cultural awakening- in the late nineteenth century
derived many of i ts ideas from the nationalism of nineteenth century
Europe, and took fire in the Boer Republics because i t met the needs
of Afrikaner *organic intellectuals* in the material circumstances of
the economic revolution being wrought in their midst under the aus-
pices of an alien imperial power. Embedded in Afrikaner cultural
nationalism of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were newer ideas about the need to promote racial domination in all
facets of economic enterprise - ideas particularly apposite to an
age of scientific racism and European imperialism, but which took
on a special resonance for a white settler people who themselves were
victims of imperialism. The ideal of the white settler farmer con-
trolling production and directing black labour was tirelessly propa-
gated in the populist agitations of the day. Robert Ross has suggested
that this imagery was derived from ancestral memories of the slave-
based mercantile economy of the south-western Gape, whence the Boers
began their long exodus into the interior from the seventeenth century
3 2
on. But we do not have to resort to atavism to explain the ideologi-
cal developments of the late nineteenth century. The ideas and images
which were being developed by educated Afrikaners had a more immediate
provenance.
Although Afrikaner agitations about the extent of land disposses-
sion were clearly exaggerated, landownership was becoming an increasing-
ly precarious status for many Boer farmers as mortgage and other forms
of indebtedness spread. Much land was taken over by capitalist interests
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War, which, whatever its causes might have been, swept aside the old Boer
republican regimes which had proved themselves structurally inadequate to
the task of modernisation and rationalisation in the new industrial era.
At first , the indigenous Afrikaners were largely excluded from the bene-
fits of these developments. But the fact that they quickly regained their
membership of the ruling caste after the War enabled them eventually to
tap and exploit the creation of new wealth. This was accomplished in
large part through the mediation of the state, which in rural areas pro-
moted a new generation of Afrikaners into the ranks of the capitalist far-
mers, especially from the second decade of the century onward.
One important and enduring intervention of the state was in the in-
stitutionalised provision of loan capital, thereby providing a more sym-
pathetic, flexible and reliable alternative "to resort to private capital.
Land Banks were established in the ex-Republics in 1907-08, and were super-
ceded by the Union Land Bank in 1912. The establishment of Land Banks
(whose facilities were available to whites only) was an important water-
shed, for i t marked the beginning of sustained, large-scale state finan-
cing of white farming. Their establishment also coincided with the trans-
fer of responsible government in the ex-Republics to local whites. The
ministries which came to power in 1907-08 were dominated by men who had
commanded Boer forces in the Anglo-Boer War. Thus the imperial power con-
the idea of
firmed not only its acceptance of / white-supremacist rural economy, but
also i ts realisation that the recently conquered Boers were bound to be
a major element in the state-sponsored rural capitalism that they envi-
saged emerging in the future. In succeeding decades state-subsidised far-
mers* cooperatives, price supports and statutory marketing monopolies
greatly expanded white farmers* dependence on the state.
The accumulation and eventual monopolisation of capital resources by
white farmers necessarily went hand in hand with the process whereby a
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during periods of bad climatic or economic conditions, such as the early
1880s, the late 1890s and the half dozen years after the close of the
Anglo-Soer V/ar. The long -^term tendency certainly seemed at the time to
be toward the gradual expropriation of the Boer economy, and the increa-
sing control of land by speculative capitalists, who were not always in-
clined to share populist resentment at the independent black farmers.
Many absentee landowners saw black tenant production as a viable long-
term option with a view to the feeding of urban markets and the filling
of corporate pockets. Such factors as these lent special urgency to the
drive to assert indigenous white control over productive resources on
the land as the mainspring of incipient Afrikaner nationalism.
The continual influx of farmers with access to capital resources on-
to the Highveld provided indigenous whites with a constant model of the
ideal to which they should strive. The newer settlers of British descent
brought with them very definite ideas of proper class relationships in
a capitalist economy, ideas which were bolstered by Lord Milner's recon-
struction regime after the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902), with i t s radical
social-engineering proclivities. The ideals embodied in the initial
sanguine policies of Milner's administration (both in terms of the pro-
motion of capitalised white land settlement by empire loyalists at the
expense of the old burgher population, and the provision of a black
labouring force) left a far deeper impression than the policies themselves,
which soon proved hopelessly impractical.•"
It was only on the basis of constant state support, however, that a
capitalised farming economy under white control eventually emerged and was
maintained. As we have been, by the early twentieth century the possi-
bi l i t ies of capital accumulation by the various means available through-
out the nineteenth century were becoming very limited: trade, transport, hunting,
soeculation were no longer readily available options for young adventurers. It was
at this point that the state took over as the main generator of productive
capital for white farmers. And the preservation of a viable productive
base increasingly depended on continued state supports at every stage in
the processes of production and marketing" of produce. To an ever greater
degree as the century progressed, the survival of white farmers (which
did not necessarily mean consistent and cumulative profit-making) required
access to fairly substantial funds from outside agricultural production,
at least initially, and continual reliance on the state's resources as a
cushion against climatic and market fluctuations.
State intervention on the necessary scale required a particular set
of historical circumstances. Primitive accumulation in the rural politi-
cal economy was predicated upon the rise of urban industry. In South Africa,
as part of the colonial periphery in the international economy of the
nineteenth century, the spread and entrenchment of capitalist relations
in u r b a, n centres, derived from the massive importation of finance
capital to exploit the rich mineral resources of the region. The estab-
lishment of heavy industry with a view to extracting raw materials for
export was a necessary precondition for the capitalist transformation
of the countryside. For only in an industrialising economy are markets
sufficiently large and expansive to allow for the emergence of a capitalist
agriculture, and only such an economy can sustain the kind of state inter-
vention which is necessary for such a rural transformation. But a neces-
sary precondition does not add up to a sufficient explanation. What dis-
tinguished South Africa from other parts of Africa with rich mineral re-
sources was that South Africa had a well-established white ruling caste,
which was able to exploit the potential created by the influx of capital
to forge a state system with the financial muscle and coercive power to
support and sustain a far-reaching process of indigenous capital formation
and social restructuring. This was especially so after the Anglo-Boer
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black labour force was created, maintained and controlled. Equally cru-
cial to the success of primitive accumulation in South Africa was the
stripping of productive resources from African peasants. This exclusionary
aspect of primitive accumulation - the denial of access to resources - is
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central in the emergence of a fully capitalist agriculture. ^ However,
contrary to the trajectory implicitly suggested by the German analogy,
the proletarianisation of black peasants in South Africa did not proceed
as a logical corollary of industrialisation and urban growth. Just as
there was no direct or unproblematical line of descent between the old
landowning class and the new capitalist farmers, so there was a discon-
tinuity in the process whereby the relatively independent black tenant
homesteads of pre-industrial times were reduced to the rural work-force
of today. The one-way procession from serf to proletarian implied by the
German analogy does not reflect the South African experience. Many black
tenant producers were amongst the beneficiaries rather than the victims
of the commercialisation of agriculture on the South African Highveld,
although their success was to be short-lived. While it is true that
demands for labour from black tenants rapidly intensified under the impact
of growing markets, it is equally clear that the end of the nineteenth
century saw a great spread and intensification of arable rent tenancy
by blacks on white-owned land, particularly in sharecroppihg arrangements.
This was a period of rapid accumulation of productive capital in the hands
of black tenants.
The decline of the black tenant farmers has generally been ascribed
in the revisionist literature solely to state action. But more than
s.tate power was required to take charge of the rural economy in the face
of a resilient and successful black peasantry. The agencies of control,
the local courts, -the police and the laws they applied were never more
than marginally effective in reshaping the countryside, valuable weapons
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though they may intermittently have been to individual white landholders.
The creation of a black labour-force was not the result of a single, ir-
reversible coup. Social-engineering legislation (such as the Natives Land
Act of 1913 which sought to outlaw sharecropping by black tenants and en-
force labour tenancy) never wrought the transformation intended by their
sanguine progenitors. The creation of a labour-force required a determined
and protracted expenditure of effort by white farmers in the day to day
struggle to bend black tenants to their will. It also required the pe-
riodical and recurrent mobilisation of racial energies in concerted drives
against the independence and the productive resources of black tenants.
Racial domination was not a condition but a process, constantly being un-
dermined and constantly being reasserted and extended. The assertion and
extension of racial domination came in cyclical waves. At times of finan-
cial boom and productive expansion (such as the years 1908-13 and again
in the mid-1920s) the mobilisation of white opinion and concerted action
against the independent tenant farmers were at their most intense. By
the second decade of the twentieth century land was becoming a scarce re-
source and the threat of eviction was becoming a real weapon in landlords*
hands. The extent of tenant mobility was increasingly becoming an index
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of their vulnerability.
Labour tenancy - the ubiquitous emergent labour relationship on the
Highveld in the first half of the twentieth century as the white farmers
gained a stranglehold on productive resources - should be seen as a solu-
tion to problems of labour supervision and control in the face of black
tenants' determination to maintain some kind of independent productive
base. It was also consistent with some of the constraints of capital.
Few farmers had the liquid capital to pay regular wages or to be able to
attract labourers at short notice for specific seasonal tasks. The radi-
cal unevenness of labour requirements, the long periods of minimal labour
21.
input in arable farming-, the utility of women's and children's labour, as
well as the utlity of black tenants' productive resources (particularly
ploughing spans): all these factors made tenant household labour prefe-
rable to proletarian wage labour, quite apart from the extreme difficulty
of mobilising, controlling and supervising a forcibly dispossessed rural
work force. Labour tenancy was thus a perfectly rational way of organi-
sing labour, although many of its advantages were to wane under the im-
pact of mechanisation from the 1940s onward.
By mid-century the productivity of capitalist farming was being
greatly increased under the auspices of a paternalistic state. Techno-
logical innovation was decisively shifting agricultural production toward
capital-intensive methods. The mechanisation of white farming on the back
of massive state subsidisation had by the 1970s vastly extended the pro-
ductive potential of the farming enterprise on the South African Highveld.
These developments conclusively robbed blacks, who were denied access to
state aid, of the advantages of greater relative productivity and of
lower relative risk which had once enabled them to prosper as independent
tenants on white-owned farms. Black productive resources and household
labour became expendible to white farmers,--"-and the seasonal intensity of
labour demands on the farms was substantially reduced. At the same time
as the labour requirements of the arable farmer were being greatly re-
duced, the mobilisation and control of a labour force were also becoming
far easier, given mass unemployment and marginalisation of the surplus
39African population in resettlement areas within reserves.
The 1950s, then, saw the beginnings of the end of the labour tenancy
system (especially as tractors made tenants' ploughing oxen not only dis-
pensible but also a nuisance) at the same time as the "black spots', many
of them farms acquired in the few years prior to the prohibition of black
land purchase in 1913, have been gradually expropriated by the Nationalist
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government, signifying the final triumph of the political economy of white
supremacy. However, these developments did not necessarily imply the
take-off of white capitalist farming into an era of sustained profitabi-
lity. Farmers' reliance on state aid did not subside. If anything it
has increased. And, as the drought of the 1980s has shown, capitalist
farming is just as tenuous, vulnerable and dependent on massive debt con-
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traction today as eighty years ago.
* * # * * *
It is not surprising that peasants continue to be a dominant feature
of the late capitalist world. Peasants make economic sense. For many
reasons, capitalist farming is a tenuous enterprise at the best of times;
vulnerability in the face of climatic conditions, the risks implicit in
agricultural investment, the difficulties of sustained accumulation, the
farmers illiquidity and reliance on credit and his tendency to indebted-
ness, and the uneven and unpredictable labour requirements over the annual
cycle. Peasants in Africa can (and sometimes do) withdraw partially from
market production at times of adverse climatic or market conditions. They
are not entirely dependent on earning a profit in order to subsist. They
can withdraw into relative autarchy during drought years. Given the mu-
tual support network of the lineage, kin-group or village, losses of pro-
ductive resources can be made good without debilitating debt contraction.
Their reliance on household labour and reciprocal work parties provides
them with a flexible and reliable work force which does not require wage
remuneration for i ts survival. It is small wonder that despite the not in-
considerable impact of a dynamic capitalism on small-scale societies
throughout Africa over a period of a century or more, most of Africa's
peoples are s t i l l able successfully to defy full incorporation into market
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relationships. What needs to be explained about the ex-colonial world
is not the persistence of peasantries, but the few instances where they
have "been systematically destroyed. Therein lies the special significance
of South Africa's unique experience.
It has often been the case, in areas as far apart as Catalonia and
Ecuador, that specialised and large-scale farming, enterprise has proved
more vulnerable to market conditions than peasant producers. Bad economic
conditions have in various places and times heralded a resurgence of pea-
sant production. Harriet Friedmann, indeed, has argued that in North
American arable farming, wage-based production has waned in the face of
a resurgence of family farming over the last hundred years. In western
Europe, the heartland of the international capitalist economy, price sup-
ports and subsidy mechanisms were necessary before the peasantry was f i -
nally displaced; self-provisioning remains a priority of many farmers,
and the family-worked smallholding remains the norm. In 1970 i t was es-
timated that in Vest German>83.7 percent of farming units were under
twenty hectares in extent; even in the United Kingdom the proportion was
52.4 percent. Furthermore, all over Europe there is evidence to suggest
that farming is widely supplemented by non-farm income. Franklin est i-
mated that in i960 only about half of the six and a half million people
in West German agriculture gained most of their income from farming.
The part-time farmer is a persistent feature of large-.-parts of Europe as
he is of rural Africa. Of course, there are many examples of successful
capital investment in large-scale agriculture. But clearly the %industria-
lisation' of agriculture is only feasible under very specific conditions.
The specific conditions under which a racially-exclusive mechanised agri-
culture based on the use of black wage labour developed in South Africa,
have been the focus of this paper.
In contrast to most revisionist interpretations of the emergence of
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modern South Africa, this article has sought to stress the contingent
factors in the transformation of rural society. There was no consis-
tent trajectory of development or inevitability either in the spread
of capitalist relations in agriculture or in the assertion of white
control over productive resources. The role of ideology and of self-
image in providing the ongoing impetus behind the'reforming of rural
society have not been inconsiderable. State intervention in the gene-
ration of capital and in cushioning farmers against the recurrent destruc-
tion of capital resources characteristic of agriculture, has been of de??
cisive importance. Revisionist interpretations of South African history
have tended to stress industrial capitalism and its need for cheap la-
bour as the central factor in the creation of the contemporary racial
order. This paper has focused on the rise of white rural populism and
the drive to secure a white-supremacist rurai-feconomy in the face of an
agressive imperial capitalism. The drive for racial supremacy at the
point of production-was more a concern of the Afrikaner petty-bour-
geoisie than of the financial and mining capitalists who presided over
the industrial revolution. But i t is also true that the drive for white
supremacy in all facets of economic enterprise was the product of the
age of industrial capitalism, rather than the product of an earlier
age of frontier violence. The Boers had inherited a tradition of
racial exclusivity in social and political spheres; but i t was only in
the circumstances of the new industrial imperialism which seemed to
threaten the expropriation of the Boer economy, that racial monopolisa-
tion of productive resources became the central tenet of indigenous
white struggle. And eventually this struggle was to develop into the
exclusive and brutal Afrikaner nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s.
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